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Energy inequalityEnergy poverty alleviation has become an important political issue in the most recent years. Several initiatives
and policies have been proposed to deal with poor access to modern sources of energy in many developing
countries. Given the large number of people lacking basic energy services, an important question is whether
providing universal access to modern energy could signiﬁcantly increase energy demand and associated CO2
emissions. This paper provides one of the few formal assessments of this problembymeans of a simple but robust
model of current and future energy consumption. The model allows mapping energy consumption globally for
different classes of energy use, quantifying current and future imbalances in the distribution of energy
consumption. Our results indicate that an encompassing energy poverty eradication policy to be met by 2030
would increase global ﬁnal energy consumption by about 7% (roughly 20 EJ). The same quantity of energy
could be saved by reducing by 15% energy consumption of individuals with standards above current European
levels. The additional energy infrastructure needed to eradicate energy poverty would produce 44–183 GtCO2
over the 21st century and contribute at most 0.13 °C of additional warming.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction and motivation
Understanding the distribution of current and future energy needs is
an important goal for research and policy. On the one hand, lack of
access to reliable energy is believed to hamper economic growth in
poor economies. This is known as ‘energy poverty’, and has received
increased political attention in most recent years. On the other hand,
energy consumption met with the current fossil fuel based energy mix
leads to emissions of greenhouse gases, which are accumulating in the
atmosphere and are the major source of global climate change.
Analyzing the extent to which these two global problems interact
with each other would allow us to better understand which policy
instruments can be put in place if both problems were to be tackled.
The contribution of this paper is to provide some quantitative input to
this discussion. We employ a reasonably simple model calibrated on
data on consumption and income distributions, and show that it can
replicate quite accurately the current distribution of ﬁnal energy
consumption by households. We use the model to assess the pressing
policy issue of energy access to different parts of the society, andthe GEMINA project, funded by
ment, Land and Sea.
nced Study, Indian Institute of
arty), massimo.tavoni@feem.it
ghts reserved.evaluate the impacts of energy poverty alleviation in terms of additional
demand of energy and associated greenhouse gas emissions for
different carbon intensity assumptions. Our tool is useful for mapping
and representing global imbalances: we show that now the poorest
3 billion people have negligible energy consumption, and that the
1 billion people with energy consumption equal or above the
European standards use 3/4th of total ﬁnal energy. Taking as given the
projections of international agencies such as the IEA, we show that in
a Business as Usual scenario in 2030, minor changes would occur in
the low energy consumption categories, with roughly the same number
of people lacking access to basic human energy needs, though with an
increased concentration in Africa. On the other hand, there will be a
large number of additions in the higher energy consumption categories,
mostly driven by economic development in the fast growing economies.
We estimate the additional energy demandwhichwould be required to
eradicate energy poverty at about 20 EJ in 2030, less than 10% of the
projected consumption in a BAU, and 15% of consumption of the most
afﬂuent categories. With different assumptions about the carbon
intensity of energy infrastructure, this additional demand would
generate carbon emissions over the century in the range of 44–
183GtCO2. This corresponds to a relatively minor contribution to global
warming. Our analysis thus supports the thesis that energy poverty and
climate change policies can be set independently from each other.
2. Measuring energy needs
The debate surrounding energy access has become a key one in
energy policy-making over the last few years, an acknowledgment of
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cannot be completely distinguished from traditional poverty alleviation,
its independent assessment is important for various reasons. First,
though poverty traps have long been recognized, their solution in
terms of policy intervention is still highly debated, with the traditional
divide between strong government intervention and laissez-faire
being blurred by the large evidence now accumulated in randomized
experiments (Duﬂo and Banerjee, 2011). Second, the policy relevance
of the subject has motivated a push towards new measurements and
data collection of energy poverty, paving the way for additional and
more accurate research in the ﬁeld. Finally, energy access is intertwined
with other pressing global issues, in particular the ﬁght against global
climate change. A joint solution of these two issues is required even if
their exact interdependence is still to be resolved. Against this
background, most of the academic discussion on energy poverty has
focused on measurement and policy, but has not yet developed formal
tools to generate numerical estimates of the impacts of energy poverty
alleviation, with only few recent exceptions (Bazilian et al., 2012).
Similarly, the integrated assessment modeling community – which
plays an active role in the assessment of climate mitigation scenarios
in the IPCC – has recently made steps forward towards an integrated
modeling approach to energy sustainability (McCollum et al., 2011),
but has dealt only to a limited extent with energy poverty (Ekholm
et al., 2010). The objective of this paper is to shed light on these issues
by providing a quantitative assessment of the distribution of future
energy needs at the global level. This allows us to pin down where
energy demand growth will come from, not only in terms of country
of residence but also in terms of segments of population, deﬁned by
levels of energy consumption. We estimate the energy needs of the
poorest segments and the range of additional emissions, depending on
the possible primary energy sources. The magnitude of global poverty
cannot be exaggerated and energy poverty is no exception. The IEA
estimates that about 1.3billion people do not have access to electricity,
the FAO states that 1 billion people are undernourished and the WHO
estimates that 830million urban residents live in slums. And the latest
estimates of poverty measured in dollar terms from the World Bank
suggest that roughly 1.3 billion people live below the poverty line of
1.25$ a day. The various dimensions of poverty – energy, food, health
and sanitation – have signiﬁcant overlap but are not perfectly correlated
(Pachauri and Spreng, 2011). This has led to a considerable effort in the
ﬁeld to construct relevant measures of energy poverty. Several indices
have been proposed in the past few years, among which are the Energy
Indicators for Sustainable Development (Foster et al., 2000; Vera and
Langlois, 2007), the Access–Consumption matrix (Pachauri et al., 2004),
the Energy for Development Index (?), the Total Energy Inconvenience
Threshold (Mirza and Szirmai, 2010) and the Multidimensional Energy
Poverty Index (Nussbaumer et al., 2012). This incomplete list reﬂects
the challenge of measuring and even of deﬁning poverty: this should
come as no surprise to poverty experts, who are aware that the concept
of absolute poverty is a contested one, as testiﬁed by the existence of
poverty glossary books (Spicker et al., 2007). The Copenhagendeclaration
of the world summit for social development deﬁnes absolute poverty as
“a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs,
including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter,
education and information. It depends not only on income but also on
access to social services”. Strikingly, energy does not appear in the list,
though its availability is instrumental for most if not all the listed basic
needs. As noted above, energy poverty experts have struggled to generate
indexes which capture the multidimensional essence of energy poverty,
but generally speaking two main approaches have been followed
(Kemmler and Spreng, 2007): either based on engineering/bottom up
estimates of energy needs and access to energy services, or from
standard income/consumption poverty measures. Direct estimates of
energy needs and services are more accurate, but are not available for
all countries, and vary in deﬁnition and measurement. Income and
consumption poverty data is much richer, mostly as a result ofsigniﬁcant data collection through surveys coordinated by the World
Bank, but is an imperfect indicator of energy poverty. A trade-off
between the two is unavoidable. For the sake of this paper, we will
stick to the consumption poverty deﬁnition, since our intention is to
build a global mapping of energy needs, and to focus not only on the
poorest but across all the main different energy consumption classes,
for which a strong correlation between energy and income has been
established (see for example, Lenzen et al., 2006).
3. Data and methods
Our approach is to build a transparent but rigorous model which can
generate global, regional and national maps of ﬁnal energy consumption
for households, by different classes of energy consumption. We then use
it to project forward in time the distribution of energy demand. This
approach builds upon and extends that of Chakravarty et al. (2009). We
build distributions of household energy consumption at the country
level assuming that household energy consumption and income or
consumption are related by a power law relation, as suggested in several
empirical studies (Lenzen et al., 2006).
In order to do so, we avail of a comprehensive database on income
and consumption distributions using World Bank and UNU-WIDER
income distribution survey databases. We model each country
income distribution using a Beta-2 (B2) probability distribution
(Chotikapanich et al., 2007). The B2 function has a small number
of parameters, and is sufﬁciently ﬂexible for almost all cases. The
B2 function is
f yð Þ ¼ y
p−1
bpB p; qð Þ 1þ yb
 pþq ; yN0 ð1Þ
where b N0, p N0, q N0 and B(p,q) is the Beta function,
B p; qð Þ ¼ Γ pð ÞΓ qð Þ
Γ pþ qð Þ ¼
Z 1
0
tp−1 1−tð Þq−1dt: ð2Þ
The p and q parameters control the shape of the Lorenz curve (or the
inequality) of the distribution which is independent of the parameter b.
We also assume that qN1which is required for the ﬁrst moment (mean
income) to exist. The mean income I is linear in the parameter b
I ¼ bp
q−1 : ð3Þ
The cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the B2 function is
F yð Þ ¼ 1
B p; qð Þ
Z y= bþyð Þ
0
tp−1 1−tð Þq−1dt ¼ By= bþyð Þ p; qð Þ ð4Þ
where Bt(p,q) is the incomplete Beta function (in Eq. (2), B(p,q) =
Bt = 1(p,q)). We also use the fact that the p.d.f. of ykf(y), for integer
k, are themselves B2 functions.
Income distribution data is usually provided in terms of income or
expenditure share of quintiles or deciles. The plot of cumulative income
share vs. cumulative population share is referred to as the Lorenz curve
in the incomedistribution literature. Essentially, it is a plot of the c.d.f. of
the normalized ﬁrst moment vs the c.d.f. The Lorenz curve provides a
visual measure of the inequality in the distribution. The Gini coefﬁcient
is deﬁned as twice the area between the diagonal line and the Lorenz
curve. A Gini coefﬁcient of 0 implies perfect equality and 1 implies
maximum inequality. We estimate the parameters of the B2 function
using a weighted non-linear least square ﬁt of the Lorenz curve of the
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example, in the case of Poland we have the following income
distribution data for the year 2003.inCumulative population1 This also implies that trad
the ﬁnal section on emissio0ition
ns.0.1al energy0.2is carbo0.4n neutral0.6. We disc0.8uss mor0.9e about1
Cumulative income share 0 0.031 0.075 0.195 0.356 0.578 0.73 12 We use the 50 percentile numbers from Table A.II.4, Annex II, of the Special Report on
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (see http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/
report/IPCC_SRREN_Annex_II.pdf) for our estimates for the CO2 intensity of different
electricity generation technologies. The estimate for the CO2 intensity oil comes from
the fact that oil is approximately 85% carbon. For gas, we use the emissions intensity ofLet X and Y denote the cumulative population and income shares
respectively. We estimate the parameters p and q by solving
argmin
p;q
∑Wi y p; qð Þ−Yð Þ2 ð5Þ
where
y p; qð Þ ¼ Binvx p;qð Þ pþ 1; q−1ð Þ and x p; qð Þ ¼ BX p; qð Þ:
The weights Wi are used to compensate for the fact that the higher
quintiles dominate the ﬁt. The parameter b can be obtained from Eq. (3).
In our model, household energy consumption is related to income/
consumption by a constant elasticity of 0.8, in line with the central
estimates of the empirical evidence based on energy surveys, though
we provide a sensitivity analysis to this important parameter. The
elasticity from various country level studies falls in a narrow range
though one would naturally expect the elasticity to vary with income
level inside countries. There have been few studies that quantify this
expectation. Our approach in this paper is to make the most
parsimonious and robust assumptions and minimize the number of
arbitrary parameters required. Given the paucity of data, we do not
take country level intra income elasticity variation into account. We
also neglect different regional energy price differences, given that our
focus is to capture the fundamental engine of growth of energy as a
function of increased levels of well being.
Assuming a power law relationship between energy and income
with elasticity e (energy~incomee), theB2distribution can be converted
to a generalized B2 distribution of population density as a function of
energy consumption.
The energy distribution (i.e., the population distribution w.r.t.
energy) is
f E yð Þ ¼
ayap−1
bapB p; qð Þ 1þ yb
 a pþq ; yN0 ð6Þ
where
a ¼ 1=e; b ¼ b1=e=R;R ¼ 1
E
beΓ pþ eð ÞΓ q−eð ÞÞ= Γ pð ÞΓ qð Þð Þ
and E is the average energy consumption. The data on energy
consumption is obtained from the IEA (Extended World Energy
Balances), measured in ﬁnal energy consumption units. Since we focus
on policies to provide access to modern energy, we disregard the
traditional energy source component of the IEA's energy statistics. This
is equivalent to counting traditional energy as having minimal useful
value, which is justiﬁed given its low conversion efﬁciency.1 Moreover,
most of the available data on traditional energy is often sketchy and
unreliable. As we are interested in household energy consumption
only we consider the fraction of the ﬁnal energy associated to
consumption and not to production. We use the coefﬁcients estimated
in Peters and Hertwich (2008) to separate household energy
consumption share, and the direct and indirect components.thisAs for future projections, we use theWorld Economic Outlook 2011
(IEA) energy and population projections to 2030. We aggregate the
country level energy probability distributions into the 14macro regions
used in the IEA projections, and for simplicity we assume that the p and
q parameters of the country level Beta-2 distributions do not change
over time (i.e., we assume constant inequality). One additional
assumption that we make is that the 2030 population of the energy @
poor is an upper bound on the population of the energy poor in the
21st century. The model is written in an open source language (Python),
and is freely available upon request. Finally, in order to convert energy
consumption to emissions of greenhouse gases, we employ different
estimates for the carbon intensity of energy and the replacement of the
energy infrastructure. The high emissions case derives from coal
powered electricity (1 kgCO2/KWh) and oil (3.12kgCO2/kg) as fuel, and
the low emissions case derives from renewable (0.014 kgCO2/KWh)
and gas (2.294kgCO2/kgoil eq).2 The global temperature rise associated
with these emissions is estimated using the linear relationship between
cumulative emissions and equilibrium temperature rise as proposed in
the carbon budget approach (Allen et al., 2009).3
In order to simplify the representation of continuous probability
density functions, and to provide a more clear connection to policy, we
use ﬁve representative categories of energy consumption deﬁned by
the thresholds shown in Table 1. The ﬁrst three signposts have been
proposed by UN Secretary-General's Advisory Group on Energy and
Climate Change (AGECC),4 and represent key incremental steps in the
energy access matrix, in terms of basic human needs, productive uses,
and modern society. Basic human needs provide basic energy services
in terms of electricity for lighting, health, education, communication
and community services, as well as modern fuels for cooking and
heating. Productive uses provide electricity and fuels to increase
productivity in agriculture, commercial activities and transportation,
such as access to mechanical energy for agriculture or irrigation,
commercial energy, or liquid transport fuels. Modern society refers to
energy services for more domestic appliances, for cooling and heating,
and for private transportation. Since our scope is to provide a mapping
of the whole society, we add a fourth category of ‘higher energy
consumers’, deﬁned by consumption equal or above the current
European average.
Policies deﬁned in terms of universal energy access by the UN
encompass both the Basic Human Needs and the Productive uses.
4. Mapping energy needs globally, now and then
We are now ready to present the main results of the model used in
this paper. Fig. 1 reports our main results in terms of global current
and future distribution of population (left panel) and energy (right
panel), across the ﬁve energy consumption categories of Table 1. The
chart shows that both now and in a 2030 BAU scenario, a large fraction
of global population will lack access to basic human needs (1.8 billion
people) and productive uses (3.4 billion people). These numbers
match quite well the current estimates of energy poverty. Between
now and 2030 more than 1 billion people will be added to the global
population; about 1/3 will go in the third and fourth energythe 1kg oil equivalent quantity of gas. (Also see Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases
Program http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/emission_factors.html.)
3 Speciﬁcally, each 1000GtCO2 emitted in the atmosphere generates roughly 0.48 °C of
warming, with a 90% conﬁdence interval range between 0.27 °C and 0.68 °C.
4 The document is available at http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/
shared/Documents/AGECC%20summary%20report[1].pdf.
Table 1
Categories of ﬁnal energy consumption and associated emissions.
Category deﬁnition Energy consumption
(GJ/capita/year)
CO2 emissions at current global average
energy mix (tCO2/capita/year)
Basic human needs: 100 kWh/capita/year+ 100 kg oil/capita/year 5 0.41
Productive uses: 750 kWh/capita/year+ 150 kg oil/capita/year 10 0.83
Modern society: 2000 kWh/capita/year+ 375 kg oil/capita/year 25 2.1
EU average (half the US average) 75 6.2
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growth of the global middle class. A more modest population increase
would occur in the energy poverty and in the energy rich categories
(in the order of 150million people added to each bin). Turning to the
distribution of energy (right panel), the chart clearly highlights the
global imbalances in energy consumption. The almost 3 and 1/2billion
energy poor contribute negligibly to global energy consumption, with
less than 10% of the total household ﬁnal energy demand. At the other
hand of the spectrum, the 1 billion people with energy consumption
levels at or above European standards is responsible for half of global
energy consumption. This is also the category where most additional
energywill be consumed in 2030with respect to today (≥20EJ), despite
the limited additions in terms of population. The category of
consumption between 25 and 75GJ/capita follows close. The appendix
provides some sensitivity with respect to the elasticity between income
and energy consumption (assumed to be equal to 0.8 for all regions in
the base case),5 indicating that the picture shown in Fig. 1 is quite
robust.
Themodels also allow us to determine the regional repartition of the
population and the energy consumption distributions, see Fig. 2. Africa
is the region where about 40% of the energy poorer (below the basic
energy need consumption of 5 GJ) reside today, and this ﬁgure is
projected to increase and approach 60% in 2030, due to strong5 Speciﬁcally, we lower it for all countries (to 0.5), increase it to all countries (to 1), and
differentiate between developing (=1) and developed countries (=0.5). This coversmost
of the spectrum of parameter estimates, though we always retain the basic assumption of
the paper of a constant elasticity relation between income and energy consumption.
Fig. 1. Global distribution of population (left panel) and HH ﬁnal energy (right panel)
across the 5 energy consumption categories, in 2009 (white bars), and additions from
2009 to 2030 (colored bars).population growth and moderate energy consumption increases in a
BAU. India instead would reduce its signiﬁcant role in the lowest
category (from 25% to 10%) but would be by far the largest contributor
(almost 50%) of the second categorywith consumption levels still below
productive uses.Movingup in the categories, themost notable change is
perhaps unsurprisingly China, which would increase its share in the
upper two categories, reaching 30% and 6% in 2030 respectively. In the
top category with energy consumption levels above those of European
standards, the OECD countries will continue to remain the largest
contributors, with 60% of the population in the top bin being from the
OECD in 2030. Energy exporting countries like Russia, and Middle East
also play an important role in the top categories, despite lower average
per capita income, due to high energy intensity.5. The energy and climate impacts of poverty alleviation
Our analysis of current and future individual energy consumption
indicates that energy poverty is, and will continue to remain prominent
in the years to come without targeted policy interventions (and
provided that such policies would work). However, it is important to
keep in mind that alleviating energy poverty is not just a tremendous
challenge per se, but that it also inter-relates to other key pressing issues
related to sustainability. It is thus important to be able to quantify the
implications of poverty alleviation on future energy consumption and
on associated emissions of greenhouse gases. The available literature
provides a contrasting picture. Most assessments by international
organization and experts' activities in the ﬁeld suggest these to be
quite moderate. For example, the IEA estimates that universal access
by 2030 would increase electricity by 2.5%, and fossil fuels by 0.8%.
The World Bank estimates that the additional emissions needed to
provide universal access to electricity could be offset by a switch of
the US vehicle ﬂeet to European standards.6 However, the impacts
might be substantial at the regional level: for example it has been
estimated that power installed capacity in Africa 2030 would increase
from 79 to 500 GW to provide full electricity access (Bazilian et al.,
2012). Moreover, poverty alleviation measures might promote
economic growth and yield an increase in energy demand beyond
expectations provided that the elasticities between income and energy
are sufﬁciently high. This has led some researchers to go as far as
suggesting that neglecting poverty reduction and pro-poor growth
policies is leading us to grossly underestimate future energy use
(Gertler et al., 2011; Wolfram et al., 2012). Several targets can be
deﬁned when dealing with poverty alleviation. Here we retain the one
in line with the UN categories of Table 1, and work out the implications
of a policywhichwould grant universal access by 2030 to aminimumof
10 GJ/capita ∗ year, so as to ensure productive uses of energy. In the
jargon of our graphs, this would correspond to providing additional
energy to the roughly 3.5 billion people, so that by 2030 no one would
be left in the lowest two categories; the additional energy would be
directed mostly to the 1.8 billion energy poorer, but also to those who6 See the World Development Report 2010, http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/
a/c.html/world_development_report_2010/abstract/WB.978-0-8213-7987-5.abstract.
Fig. 2. Regional shares of population across the 5 energy consumption categories in 2009 (upper panel) and 2030 (lower panel).
7 The IEA has focused on a policy which would allow to achieve universal electricity
access, assuming a basic level of electricity for every person gaining access. Our policy
allows for a higher threshold of minimum consumption (both basic and productive uses),
and thus leads us to estimating slightly higher ﬁgures.
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results of this energy poverty eradication program for the mostly
affected regions, as well as globally. It indicates that globally the
additional energy consumption of this poverty alleviation program
would be slightly less than 20 EJ, or about 7% of total ﬁnal energy
consumption in 2030. The bulk of the additions would fall on Africa,
whose aggregate ﬁnal household energy consumption would need to
exactly double with respect to the case without a poverty alleviation
policy. Signiﬁcant increases in demand – in the order of 20% – would
also result in South and South-East Asia. This suggests that albeit the
minor global impacts of energy poverty eradication, some regions
would experience quite dramatic changes.
Our results indicate that the repercussions of a policy meant to
eradicate energy poverty would be relatively small on global energydemand. Similar results have been suggested in other studies. For
example, the International Energy Agency has simulated a universal
access policy in 2030,7 and has ﬁnd that this would lead to an increase
of global energy demand by only 1%. This is expected to require total
investments in the order of 1 USD Trillion, or about 3% of the total
energy-related infrastructure investment. Moreover, it has been shown
that only a combination of policies that lowers costs for modern cooking
fuels and stoves, along with more rapid electriﬁcation, can enable the
realization of the energy poverty reduction goals (Pachauri et al., 2013).
Table 2
The impacts of energy poverty eradication policy in 2030 on energy consumption,
regionally and globally.
Region Final HH energy
consumption in
a BAU (EJ)
Additional energy
consumption for the
poverty eradication
policy (EJ)
Energy
consumption
increase over
BAU (%)
World 254.4 18.9 7%
Africa 9.5 9.7 102%
India 14.8 3.4 23%
Other non
OECD Asia
18.0 3.9 22%
China 38.1 0.87 2%
Other Latin
America
8.3 0.66 8%
Brazil 7.3 0.18 2%
S72 S. Chakravarty, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics 40 (2013) S67–S73The additional energy demand can also be translated into additional
CO2 emissions depending on the carbon intensity of the energy mix.
This is important if we want to assess the extent to which the energy
poverty and the climate change agenda interact with each other. In
order to do so, we assess different scenarios of carbon intensity of the
energy mix, for a targeted energy poverty policy which linearly ramps
up the energy consumption of the energy poor such that in 2030 the
minimum per capita household energy consumption is 10GJ/year. The
purpose of this exercise is to estimate the mean and upper bound on
the additional cumulative emissions generated until 2100. We assume
that the additional energy has an intensity in the range 0.036 tCO2/GJ
[Low] to 0.112 tCO2/GJ [High]. The ‘Low’ estimate uses renewables for
generating electricity and natural gas as the clean fuel (cooking, heating,
etc.) whereas the ‘High’ estimate uses coal for electricity and oil as fuel.
We assume that, given the long life of energy infrastructure, the
additional infrastructure will be in place for another 30 years (i.e.
constant emissions until 2060). Finally, we make two different
assumptions for the retirement of the additional energy infrastructure
in the period 2060–2100: in the ‘optimistic’ case the additional
infrastructure linearly ramps down to zero emissions in 2100. In the
‘pessimistic’ case, the additional emissions stay constant. Table 3 reports
the estimated emissions and their breakdown in the three periods, as
well as a quantiﬁcation of the impacts of these emissions on global
warming as measured by the increase in surface global mean
temperature. The table shows that the cumulative emissions due to
energy poverty eradication would be in the range of 44 to 183 GtCO2,
with the discrepancy mostly attributable to the use and retirement of
the additional energy infrastructure in the long term. In terms of
consequences for global warming, the induced temperature change
would be very limited, below 0.13 °C in all cases with high probability.
It is also instructive to compare this level of emissions to the carbon
budget consistent with policies aimed at climate stabilization; climate
stabilization policies compatible with the 2 °C objective entailTable 3
Estimated additional emissions and temperature rise from an energy poverty alleviation progr
Low
Optimistic
2009–2030: Energy poverty alleviation emissions (GtCO2) 8.0
2030–2060: Use of additional energy infrastructure (GtCO2) 21.8
2060–2100: Retirement of additional infrastructure (GtCO2) 14.6
2009–2100: Total emissions (GtCO2) 44.4
Additional temperature increase (degree C): mean 0.02
Additional temperature increase (degree C): 10–90 percentile [0.012–0.03]cumulative emissions over the century in the range of 1500–
2500GtCO2, and thus the emissions associated with the energy poverty
policy would increase themitigation effort by at most 7%. Carbon prices
for a 2C climate policy (e.g. 450ppm-eq) have been estimates at 12–120
$/tCO2 in net present value, with a median of around 40$/tCO2 Clarke
et al. (2009); taking this last value the carbon costs of the energy
eradication program would be at most in the order of 8–9 USD trillion
(for the high scenario of 183GtCO2).
Finally, since our analysis has focused only on modern energy, we
have not accounted for the additional implications of switching from
traditional to modern means of energy. Moving cooking to LPG from
biomass would increase fossil energy demand, but would displace
biomass consumption. Recent work has quantiﬁed that this reduction
is as much as 12–15 EJ Pachauri et al. (2013). Given that biomass is
often harvested unsustainably, this reduction could lead to a reduction
of biomass related emissions which would further lower the climate
impact of the energy poverty program, in addition to generatingwelfare
gains from air quality improvement.6. Concluding remarks
Modern sources of energy like electricity and clean cooking fuels are
the prerequisite of a lifewith aminimal standard of comfort and dignity.
There is a tremendous imbalance in the access to and consumption of
these energy sources today: the poorest 3 billion people suffer from
debilitating energy poverty while the richest 1 billion consume an
overwhelming fraction. Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and South East
Asia are home tomost of theworld's energy poor. The projected growth
under BAU will not lead to sufﬁcient improvement in energy poverty
eradication, especially in Africa. Countries like China will be successful
inmoving a signiﬁcant number of people to higher energy consumption
brackets. This paper proposes a simple model to quantify the number
and global distribution of the energy poor, building on the data and
methodologies developed to study income distribution. The model
proposed in this paper is used to estimate the global distribution of
energy consumption and its projected evolution in the next 30 years.
It is useful for quantifying and mapping global imbalances. We show
that a global energy poverty reduction policy aimed at providing 10GJ
energy per capita to the global energy poor would increase global
energy demand by 7% in 2030; energy demand would increase
substantially in some speciﬁc regions, most notably in Africa, where it
would double. When accounting for the long lasting impacts of the
needed energy infrastructure, we show that this policy would have a
very small impact on climate change mitigation, even under scenarios
where the additional energy infrastructure is carbon intensive. We
estimate that the additional infrastructure will produce 44–183 GtCO2
over the 21st century and contribute at most 0.13 °C warming. This
impact is manageable when combined with mitigation and efﬁciency
improvements in other ﬁelds, and the management of these emissions
would not pose a serious threat to the achievement of climate
protection goals, unless these are very stringent. The beneﬁts toam.
High
Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic
8.0 24.9 24.9
21.8 67.9 67.9
29.1 45.3 90.6
58.9 138.1 183.4
0.028 0.066 0.088
[0.016–0.04] [0.037–0.094] [0.049–0.125]
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immense.
We must remind the reader that the model has several limitations.
The robustness of the income-energy elasticity is not without some
variance, although the sensitivity analysis shown in Appendix A
provides qualitatively similar results. The estimates focus on access to
modern energy, considering traditional energy as essentially useless,
and thus results need further investigation. Finally, the real question is
whether energy poverty alleviation and pro-poor growth policies will
lead to signiﬁcantly faster rise in the growth of middle classes and
their substantially higher consumption and associated emissions.
Recent history shows that there is no clear answer to this question,
different countries having had different growth trajectories from similar
starting points.
Appendix A. Sensitivity analysisFig. 3. Low elasticity. As in Fig. 1, but with an income elasticity of energy equal to 0.5 for all
countries.
Fig. 5. Regional variation in elasticity. As in Fig. 1, but with an income elasticity of energy
equal to 1 for developing countries (e.g. with today income below 12,000 USD per capita
(PPP)) and 0.5 for industrialized countries.
Fig. 4.High elasticity. As in Fig. 1, but with an income elasticity of energy equal to 1 for all
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